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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY P. MASSEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
LEWIS H. PROTHERO and ALENE 
PROTHERO, husband and wife, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 18213 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered after a 
trial on the merits by the Honorable Robert F. Owens 
District Court Judge Pro Tern, of the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Iron County, State of Utah, 
filed December 14th, 1981, which judgment ruled in 
favor of Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter "Plaintiff") 
and against Defendants-Appellants (hereinafter 
"Defendants") on Plaintiff's claim of quiet title in 
and ~o a certain undivided interest in real property. 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal Defendants pray for reversal of the 
Trial Court Judgment and further pray that judgment be 
entered as a matter of law in favor of Defendants and 
against Plaintiff, and that title to the subject 
property be quieted in said Defendants to the exclusion 
of any interest by Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by Plaintiff to set aside 
a tax deed conveying title to certain real property to 
the Defendant Lewis Prothero, and his wife Alene 
Prothero, or in the alternative to declare that 
Plaintiff still had a valid interest in the property 
despite the tax deed. 
By way of background, the property in dispute was 
initially owned by Jonathon and Arny Prothero. 
Plaintiff and Defendant are brother and sister, and 
are, along with three others not parties to this 
action, the sole heirs at law of Jonathon and Arny 
Prothero. 
The property in dispute consists of three ( 3) 
parcels. The first is a home located in Paragonah, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Utah; the second is a farm located in the area 
immediately adjacent to Paragonah, Utah; and the third 
is a vacant lot located in Paragonah, Utah. 
As was stated above, the property was originally 
owned by Jonathon and Amy Prothero. Upon their deaths, 
the property passed by intestacy to their children. 
Mr. and Mrs. Prothero lived in the home and farmed the 
farm ground until their deaths in 1953 and 1958, 
respectively. Upon the death of Jonathon and Amy 
Prothero, one Raymond Prothero and one Barton Prothero, 
brothers of the parties hereto, continued to live in 
the home and to farm the farm property until their 
deaths in 1961 and 1966 respectively. (T. 13-18,). 
Since the death of David B. Prothero in 1966, no 
one has lived in the home in question but the Defendant 
Lewis Prothero has since that time continuely farmed 
the farm property, has made improvements thereon (T. 
87-90) has taken care of, maintained and improved the 
home, (T. 85-90) , and has paid all taxes on all three 
(3) parcels (T. 90). These facts are not disputed by 
Plaintiff. 
Defendants claim title to the three (3) parcels of 
property in question by virtue of two separate tax 
deeds, both dated May 31st, 1967, Exhibits D-2 and D-3 
at the trial, and under the doctrine of adverse 
possession. 
4 
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The record shows that the property taxes for the 
years 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966 were not paid (T. 
64) and that the property was thereafter sold to Iron 
County for the tax deficiency on January 15th, 1963. 
(See Exhibit 4). There was no redemption from the sale 
to the county and the property was subsequently sold by 
the county for taxes on May 31st, 1967. Defendants 
purchased at that sale, and received the tax deeds 
which were immediately recorded imparting notice to all 
persons including Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not 
contested the validity of the tax deed, nor has she 
raised any defects in the procedures followed by the 
county in either the January 15th, 1963 sale or the May 
31st, 1967 sale. It is by the tax deeds described 
above that Defendants claim full title to the property 
in question. 
As early as May of 1973 Defendant made it known to 
Plaintiff that he claimed the property by virtue of the 
tax title (T. 72-73, 73-80). On that date, Plaintiff 
wanted to go into the home in question. Defendant told 
her she could not have a key, that the property was his 
and that he had purchased the property at a tax sale. 
Even though these facts were made known to Plaintiff, 
she did not file this action until August of 1977. 
5 
"JI 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff contends, and the trial court found, 
that despite the unconditional nature of the tax deeds 
which name only Defendants Lewis and Alene Prothero as 
Grantees, the Plaintiff and the other heirs of Jonathan 
and Amy Prothero, maintained their intestate interest 
in the property. 
In upholding the Plaintiff's interest, the Court 
found that upon the death of Jonathan and Amy Prothero 
the property passed to Plaintiff, Defendant and the 
other heirs as tenants in common and that the tenancy 
was still in existence at the time of the sale on May 
31st, 1967. (See paragraphs 1, 2 of the Court's 
Conclusion of Law, dated December 2nd, 1981). The 
Court then found that because of the tenancy in common, 
and because of family tradition and the nature of the 
occupancy by Defendant, a fiduciary duty existed and 
the purchase by Defendant Lewis Prothero acted as a 
purchase for and on behalf of all of the heirs. (See 
paragraphs 2, and 3 the Court's Conclusions of Law, 
dated December 2nd, 1981) . The Court also imposed that 
same fiduciary duty on Alene Prothero "by reason of her 
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being named as a Grantee in the tax deeds." (See 
paragraph 4 of the Court's Conclusions of Law, dated 
December 2nd, 1981). 
As will be discussed below, Defendants contend 
that the Court erred in several ways. First, the Court 
erred in holding that the May 31st, 1967 sale inured to 
the benefit of the other heirs of Jonathan and Amy 
Prothero. Secondly, any such claim of co-tenancy as 
determined by the trial court is barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-5.1, 5.2 (1953 as amended). And third, 
even if Plaintiff had a valid interest after the tax 
sale in 1967, that interest was extinguished by 
Defendants adverse possession. 
POINT ONE 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PURCHASE BY 
DEFENDANTS WAS FOR ALL OF THE HEIRS OF JONATHAN AND AMY 
PROTHERO, DEFENDANTS HERETO CLAIM TITLE PURSUANT TO A 
GOOD AND VALID TAX DEED ISSUED BY IRON COUNTY IN 1967, 
AND PLAINTIFF. s CLAIM CHALLENGING THAT TAX TITLE rs 
THEREFORE BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § § 78-12-5.l, 5.2 
(19.53). 
On May 31st, 1967, the Defendants obtained title 
to the property in dispute by two (2) tax deeds issued 
7 
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by Iron County pursuant to the terms of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-10-64 (1953). Plaintiff does not dispute the fact 
that the holder of a valid tax title holds such title 
free and clear from all other inferior claims. The 
Plaintiff, however, contends and the trial court found 
that the tax title is not valid as to her, and that the 
purchase was for the benefit of her and the other heirs 
of her parents. 
Even assuming that argument to be valid, which is 
certainly not conceded, any claim by Plaintiff to the 
property is barred by the statute of limitations as to 
tax deeds. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1953 as 
amended) provides as follows: 
No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless the Plaintiff or his 
predecessor was seized or possessed of such 
property within seven years from the 
commencement of such action; provided, 
however, that with respect to actions or 
defenses brought or interposed for the 
recovery or possession of or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership of real property 
against the holder of a tax title to such 
property, no such action or defense shall be 
commenced or interposed more than four years 
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
or transfer creating such tax title unless 
the person commencing or interposing such 
action or defense or his predecessor has 
actually occupied or been in possession of 
such property within four years prior to the 
commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense. . (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, Section 78-12-5.2 provides: 
No action or defense for the recovery or 
8 
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possession of real property or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership thereof shall be 
commenced or interposed against the holder of 
a tax title after the expiration of four 
years from the date of the sale, conveyance 
or transfer of such tax title to any county, 
or directly to any other purchase (sic) 
thereof at any public or private tax sale and 
after the expiration of one year from the 
date of this act. Provided, however, that 
this section shall not bar any action or 
defense by the owner of legal title to such 
property where he or his predecessor has 
actually occupied or been in actual 
possession of such property within four years 
from the commencement or interposition of 
such action or defense. (Emphasis added). 
These two statutes directly control the facts of the 
instant case and bar the action as a matter of law. It 
cannot be disputed that this action is an action "to 
quiet title or determine the ownership of real property 
against the holder of a. tax title to such property." 
Indeed, the judgment of the trial court quieted title 
to the property in the Plaintiff, as her interest 
appears, and had the affect of determining the 
ownership to that property. Likewise, it cannot be 
disputed that the Defendant and his wife are the 
holders of a tax title. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5. 3 
defines a tax title as "any title to real property, 
whether valid or not which has been derived through or 
is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of 
such property in the course of a statutory proceeding 
for the liquidation of any tax levied against such 
n 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
property whereby property is relieved from a tax lien." 
The trial court found that this statute was not 
applicable since "the legislative intent was manifestly 
to enhance marketability of tax titles by cutting off 
rights of previous owners. A dispute among tax title 
Grantees does not infringe upon this purpose~" (See 
paragraph no. four of the trial court's findings dated 
August 12th, 1981.) This finding is in error since the 
statute by its terms specifically states that no action 
shall be brought longer than four years after the date 
of the tax deed. Defendants-Appellants contend that 
the trial court went beyond its authority, and acted 
inconsistently with the law by ignoring the specific 
language of the statute under the pretense of 
interpreting legislative intent. 
This Court has considered the statutes discussed 
above on several occasions, and though none directly 
control this case, has each time held that the statute 
applies according to its specific language to bar any 
action brought more than four years after the tax deed. 
See, Dye v. Miller & Viele, 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978); 
Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 
(1957), affd. on rehearing, 8 Utah 2d 348, 334 P.2d 759 
(1959). 
10 
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~----
The Court most recently considered these statutes 
in Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). 
In that case the Plaintiffs (record owners of certain 
property) had challenged the tax title of Defendants 
because of certain improprieties in the sale. In 
enforcing the statute the Court stated, "these tax 
purchasers may avail themselves of the special statue 
of limitation regardless of either the invalidity of 
their tax title or their inability to establish an 
affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title." 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d at 831 (citations 
omitted} . It is also important to note that in that 
case this Court specifically refused to extend the 
statute beyond its express terms or to reach beyond the 
terms of the statute in determining the scope of its 
application. There is no reason in law or logic why 
this rule should not apply to claims asserted by an 
ousted co-tenant. Indeed, a holding otherwise would 
subvert the purposes for which the statute of 
limitations was adopted. See, (Lear, Utah's Short 
Statues of Limitation for Tax Titles: The Continuing 
Specter of Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond Corp. - A 
Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
457.) In that article, in urging for a more strict 
enforcement of Utah's statutes of limitations for tax 
1 l 11 
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titles, the author pointed out the effects of less than 
strict enforcement: 
First, title examiners cannot rely on the 
statute to nullify defects that should no 
longer subject to attack. Occasionally, 
title insurance is refused all together. The 
second consequence is that tax titles are 
undesirable and lack marketability; they are 
often avoided for their nuisance value. 
Thus Defendants contend that the trial court erred 
by not following the clear mandate of the sections 
stated above. Those sections provide that no action to 
quiet title or determine interests in real property 
shall be commenced against the holder of a tax title 
more than four years after the date of the tax deed. 
It is undisputed that the tax deed in this case was 
dated May 31st, 1967. It is undisputed that the 
Defendant and his wife Alene Prothero are holders of 
tax title. It is undisputed that this action was 
commenced in August of 1977. It is undisputed that 
this is an action to quiet title to or determine an 
interest in real property. The action is barred by the 
statute of limitations stated above and the trial court 
therefore erred in not applying said statute. 
At the trial in this matter, one other issue was 
raised in relation to this statute. Plaintiff asserted 
that the above described statutes of limitation were 
not applicable to her since she fit within the proviso 
1 ? 
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stated there in, namely, that she had been in "actual 
occupancy or possession" of the property within the 
last four years. This is clearly contrary to the 
evidence produced at trial. The recent case of 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981) 
discussed the type of possession necessary to bring a 
person within the exceptions stated in Sections 
78-12-5.1, 5.2. In that case the Plaintiffs contended 
that since they were record owners of the premises 
their possession was implied in law and that possession 
constituted the possession or occupancy required to 
come within the exception. The Supreme Court 
specifically stated that only actual possession would 
suffice. The record in this case discloses that the 
Plaintiff never possessed nor occupied the property. 
Indeed, she left Utah shortly after World War II and 
the only times she went on the property after 1967 were 
on infrequent visits to Utah which occurred at a 
maximum of once every year, for a period of a couple of 
days each time. (T. 23-26). In fact, Plaintiff 
testified at the time of trial that she had never 
visited the farm property and did not even know where 
it was located. (T. 26). Clearly that does not 
suffice as the actual possession or occupancy within 
the meaning of the statute. 
1 1 1 
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Plaintiff also contends that since she was a 
tenant in common with Defendant that his possession was 
tantamount to her possession. This Court iri 
Frederikson, supra, specifically held that possession 
presumed by law, such as the possession asserted here 
by the Defendant through Plaintiff, will not suffice 
and the Frederikson case is controlling on this point. 
Clearly, then, Plaintiff was not in actual 
possession and therefore was not within the exceptions 
stated in Sections 78-12-5.1, 5.2. The bar imposed by 
those Sections remain valid as against her. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PURCHASE BY 
DEFENDANTS WAS FOR THE BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFF AND THE 
OTHER HEIRS OF JONATHAN AND AMY PROTHERO, AND THEREFORE 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY EVEN IF THIS 
ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS WERE TENANTS IN COMMON AT 
THE TIME OF THE MAY 31st 1967 SALE. 
As has been discussed, the crux of Plaintiff's 
14 
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argument, and the basis for the Court's finding in this 
case, was the alleged fiduciary duty imposed upon Lewis 
and Alene Prothero which was the vehicle enabling the 
Court to find that his purchase was a purchase for all. 
The Court found that the fiduciary duty was created in 
two ways. First, the Court found that the Plaintiff 
and Defendant Lewis Prothero were tenants in common as 
to the property at the time of the May 1967 sale and 
therefore the purchase by said Defendant was for the 
benefit of Plaintiff and all other tenants in conunon. 
The Court erred in finding such a tenancy in common and 
basically ignored the record ownership of Defendant 
Alene Prothero. 
While the Prothero children may have owned the 
property as tenants in common immediately following the 
death of their mother, that tenancy did not continue to 
the May sale in 1967. On the contrary, the property 
was sold to Iron County for taxes on January 15th, 
1963. The law is very clear that any conveyance to a 
third-party of the entire property terminates any 
existing co-tenancy relationship. The rule is well 
stated as follows: 
Since unity of possession is the very essence 
of a tenancy in common, it is clear that 
anything which severs or destroys that unity 
must necessarily terminate the tenancy. 
Thus, a tenancy in common will come to an end 
upon forfeiture or abandonment of the common 
1 £) 1 
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property, upon its conveyance, voluntary or 
otherwise, to a stranger, or upon the 
definite ouster, by one co-tenant of his 
fellows. 
20 Am.Jur. 2d Co-tenancy and Joint Ownership § 31 
(1965) (citations omitted). 
The conveyance to Iron County for taxes in 1963 
was such a conveyance within the mandate of this 
general rule and therefore any co-tenancy relationship 
which might have existed was terminated in January of 
1963. While the parties may have retained a redemption 
period for four years after the date of that sale 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-56 (1953 as 
amended) , that redemption was never exercised and is 
certainly not enough to continue the co-tenancy 
relationship when actual title is in a stranger to the 
co-tenancy. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A FIDUCIARY 
DUTY UPON DEFENDANTS BY VIRTUE OF PRIOR USE OF THE 
PROPERTY AND FAMILY TRADITION. 
In addition to the trial court's finding that a 
fiduciary duty was created as to both Lewis and Alene 
Prothero (because of the tenancy in common under 
intestacy), the trial court also found such a duty was 
created by virtue of certain representations allegedly 
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made by Defendant Lewis ·Prothero, and because of the 
fact that the family occupant of the premises had 
traditionally paid the taxes thereon. While there is 
some authority for the proposition that under certain 
conditions such a duty will be imposed, it is limited 
to situations were the tax purchaser is ,under a legal 
or moral obligation to pay the taxes. See, e.g. , 
Crofts v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 350, 313 P.2d 808 (1957). 
In this case Defendants were not even living on the 
property when the 1962 taxes were assessed. Certainly 
no such obligation could be imposed. Defendant has 
been been unable to locate any direct authority on this 
point and therefore contends that the finding by the 
Court was in error and is unsupported by any legal 
theory. The Court apparently arbitrarily imposed this 
nebulous fiduciary duty on the basis of an estoppel 
type argument. Defendants contend that this finding 
was clearly in error. 
Since the Court erred in finding the fiduciary 
relationship, it follows that the Court erred in 
finding that the purchase by Defendants was a purchase 
for and on behalf of Plaintiff. 
1 7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT THREE 
EVEN ASSUMING THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THE 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, THAT OBLIGATION TERMINATED IN 
1973 WHEN DEFENDANT NOTIFIED PLAINTIFF THAT HE WAS 
CLAIMING SOLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF HIS 
TAX DEED. 
The trial court found as a matter of law that if 
the Defendant notified the Plaintiff of his intention 
to claim title adverse to hers, that any fiduciary 
obligation was terminated and the statute of 
limitations (assuming that it had not already started 
to run) would at that time begin to run. (See 
paragraph no. 6 of the Court's Conclusions of Law dated 
December 2nd, 1981). The Court found, however, as a 
matter of fact, that Defendant did not make this 
intention known to the Plaintiff until 1974 or 
thereafter, and thus the·action was brought within the 
four year statute of limitations. 
While Defendants agree with the court's statement 
of the law (that is, if the statute of limitations did 
not begin to run upon the date of the tax deed, it did 
begin to run as soon as Defendant notified Plaintiff of 
his intention to claim the property by virtue of those 
18 
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tax deeds), Defendant disagrees with the Court's 
application of law to fact and contends that the 
Court's factual findings is not supported by the 
evidence. While there was some testimony to the 
contrary, the only logical and creditable evidence 
indicated that Defendants' adverse claim was made known 
to the Plaintiff in May of 1973. At this point, by the 
Court's finding, the statute of limitations should have 
begin to run, even assuming it did not start on the day 
of the tax deed, and therefore Plaintiff's action 
should be barred. 
This position is supported by the record wherein 
the Defendant Lewis Prothero testified that he clearly 
made known to the Plaintiff in May of 1973 his adverse 
claim to her interests and the fact that he was 
claiming the property as his own by virtue of the tax 
title. (T. 72-73, 78-80). Mr. Prothero testified that 
on that date, Plaintiff Mrs. Massey was in Utah 
visiting. She asked Mr. Prothero for a key and he told 
her she could not have a key, that the property was 
his, and that he had bought it at a tax sale. The 
testimony of Lewis Prothero was substantiated by 
similar testimony from Alene Prothero. (T. 97-99). 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Prothero also testified that in 
May of 1972, the Plaintiff's son, and apparently some 
, 0 
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of his friends, had come onto the property and removed 
some valuable personal property from the old home (T. 
78-82, 96-97). This incident apparently prompted 
Defendants to a decision that no other family members 
should be allowed on the property after that date. 
It is by reason of these two occasions that 
Defendants contend that the trial court should have 
found as a matter of law that in 1973 (and possibly as 
early as 1972) the Defendants "brought home" to 
Plaintiff the fact that they were claiming title 
adverse to Plaintiff and under the Court's application 
of the law, the statute of limitations, if it had not 
already begin to run, should have begun at that point. 
Since the statute of limi,tations is four years and this 
action was filed in August of 1977, any claim by 
Plaintiff is therefore barred. 
POINT FOUR 
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT 
PROPERLY FOUND THERE WAS A FIDUCIARY DUTY ON THE PART 
OF LEWIS PROTHERO, THE COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN IMPOSING 
THE SAME FIDUCIARY DUTY ON ALENE PROTHERO. 
The tax deeds issued in May of 1967 conveyed the 
20 
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property to Lewis Prothero and Alene Prothero. The 
trial court found that the fiduciary obligations stated 
above which were imposed upon Lewis Prothero were also 
imposed on Alene Prothero by virtue of her simply being 
named as a Grantee on the tax deeds. There is no 
evidence iti the record which indicated any relationship 
of any kind between Alene Prothero and Plaintiff. 
Alene Prothero was not a co-tenant with Plaintiff, she 
was not a member of the family, she made no 
representations or promises to Plaintiff and was indeed 
a stranger to the prior title. Her claim to the 
property was solely and exclusively by virtue of the 
tax deed. The Court found no other conduct or legal 
relationship of any kind on her part contributed to the 
fiduciary obligation. Yet the Court found that her 
title had to be shared with Plaintiff by virtue of her 
being named a Grantee on the tax deed. This legal 
burden imposed by the trial court was clearly in error 
and is totally insupported by any concept of law or 
equity. The Court should therefore minimally hold that 
the record interest of Alene Prothero was not effected 
by any claim of Plaintiff and if Plaintiff prevails, 
she takes subject to Alene Prothero's undivided 
one-half ownership interest in the subject property. 
"), 
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POINT FIVE 
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SET 
FORTH ABOVE, AND FURTHER ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF DID 
HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY FOLLOWING 
THE MAY 1967 SALE, ANY INTERESTS CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF 
HAVE BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY THE DEFENDANTS' ADVERSE 
POSSESSION. 
In addition to the statutes of lirni tation 
discussed above, Defendant has established title to the 
property by adverse possession. The Utah Code allows 
adverse possession if the party claiming such 
possession has been in actual occupancy and has paid 
all taxes on the premises for a seven-year period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 (1953 as amended). In cases 
such as this, however, where the party claiming such 
possession does so by virtue of a tax deed, the period 
of possession is shortened to four years. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-7.1, 12.1 (1953 as amended). In the 
instant case, the evidence is uncontroverted that the 
Defendant occupied the pTemises beginning in 1966 and 
occupied them continuely thereafter up to the present 
day. In addition, the Defendant improved the premises, 
22 
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including both the farm land and house, paid taxes 
thereon and was the only one ever claiming possession 
thereto. 
Even assuming that the Plaintiff was a co-tenant 
during this possession the rule is virtually unanimous 
that one co-tenant can adversely possess another 
co-tenant if the possession is sufficiently open and 
notorious so as to give the other tenant notice that 
the party in possession claims exclusive ownership. 
Kennedy v. Reinhart, 574 P.2d 1119 (Or. 1978); Zolezzi 
v. Michelis, 195 P.2d 835 (Cal. App. 1948); See 
generally, 3 Arn Jur. 2d Adverse Possession §§ 173-180 
(1962). When Plaintiff visited the property prior to 
1973, she knew Defendants were in possession, had made 
improvements, and were utilizing the subject property. 
Furthermore, the tax deeds were of record, and she was 
thus charged with implied notice of the same under Utah 
Code Ann. 5 7-1-6. As has been discussed above, the 
Defendant notified Plaintiff in May of 1973 that he 
claimed title to the property solely and independently 
by virtue of his tax deeds. In addition, he refused to 
allow Plaintiff to enter the home and further refused 
to give her any keys so she could do so. (T. 72-73, 
78-80). Again, this testimony was substantiated by the 
testimony of Alene Prothero to the same effect. (T. 
98-99). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The record shows that the Defendants in this 
action have been in open, notorious and exclusive 
possession of the premises for ten years prior to the 
initiation of this lawsuit. (T. 23-24) In addition, 
they have maintained, cared for and improved all of the 
property. (T. 87-90). Defendants therefore own the 
premises by adverse possession. Therefore, even 
assuming for argument that Plaintiff's claim is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, the Defendants 
should prevail as a matter of law on the theory of 
adverse possession. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' position in this matter is a simple 
straight forward one. Defendants purchased the title 
to this property in May of 1967 by a tax deed issued 
. 
from Iron County to Defendants as Grantees. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-5.1, 5.2 specifically states that no 
action to determine an ownership interest or to quiet 
title to real property against a holder of a tax deed 
can be commenced more than four years after the date of 
the deed. The tax deed granting title to the 
Defendants was dated May 31st, 1967 and this action was 
not instituted until August of 1977. The action is 
24 
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therefore barred by the statute of limitations and the 
trial court erred in not so holding. 
Additionally, even assuming that the action is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court 
erred in finding that a fiduciary relationship was 
created as to both Defendants and that the Defendants 
purchase at the tax sale was for the benefit of all 
other heirs and co-tenants. In the first place, there 
was no co-tenancy at the time of the sale in May of 
1967 since the property had already been sold to a 
"stranger" in January of 1963. Secondly, the nebulous 
fiduciary duty based on the estoppel argument is not 
substantiated by the law or the facts. Since the Court 
erred in finding the fiduciary relationship and thus in 
its finding that the purchase by Defendants was a 
purchase for all of the other heirs and co-tenants, the 
Plaintiff had no interest in and to the property and 
the Defendants are sole owners thereto by virtue of 
their tax deed. 
Finally, further assuming that the Court finds in 
favor of Plaintiff as to the arguments discussed above, 
any title which Plaintiff may have had at some time in 
the past has been cut off by the Defendants' adverse 
possession, since 1967 and at least since 1973. 
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Minimally the Court should award to Defendant 
Alene Prothero an undivided one-half interest in the 
su~ject property by reason of her ten-year record 
ownership in the subject property. 
Defendants, ·however, specifically request that 
this Court reverse the ruling of the trial court and 
find as a matter of law that Defendants are owners of 
the property in questions free and clear of any claims 
or interests of the Plaintiff thereto. 
DATED this 17th day of May, 1982. 
Attorneys for Defendants -
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of May, 
1982, two (2) copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF 
were mailed to Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Cedar 
City, Utah 84720. 
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